by Mohammed Bello Doka
Matthew 10:34 (KJV)
“Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword.”
Nigeria’s violence debate has been built on selective memory and selective language. Certain actors are permanently branded as terrorists based on behavior and outcomes, while others—committing the same acts—are laundered through euphemisms like reprisals, communal clashes, or self-defence. This article applies one rule only: the same outcome-based logic already used to condemn Fulani herdsmen will be applied consistently—to everyone.
This is not a theological argument.
It is a behavioral one.
Behavior. Outcomes. Impunity.
That is the standard used daily in Nigerian headlines. That is the standard used here.
The Rule That Governs Public Condemnation
Fulani herdsmen are labelled terrorists without a manifesto, without a central command, and often even when attacks are explicitly described as reprisals. Villages are destroyed. Civilians are killed. Communities are displaced through fear. No justice follows. The label sticks because of outcomes, not ideology.
By that same rule, any group—Christian or Muslim—whose actions meet those thresholds must be judged the same way. Reprisal does not cancel terror. Absence of doctrine does not cancel terror. Outcome decides.
Independence to 1970: Context That Is Usually Erased
Claims that Nigeria saw “no Christian-initiated violence” before 1970 collapse under basic historical scrutiny. Context matters.
January 1966 Coup: First Blood Was Drawn
On 15 January 1966, a coup led predominantly by southern, largely Christian military officers overthrew Nigeria’s civilian government. Key figures of the Northern Muslim political leadership were assassinated, including Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Premier Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto.
This was not a religious sermon, but it was political violence initiated by a Christian-dominated southern officer corps against a northern Muslim leadership class. That fact is routinely downplayed in modern narratives.
For background and documentation, see historical summaries referenced in:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
The point is not justification. The point is sequence.
1966 Pogroms: Reprisal, Not Spontaneous Evil
The anti-Igbo pogroms of 1966—in which thousands of Igbo Christians were killed in northern cities—were reprisals. That is not a moral defence; it is a factual description acknowledged by historians.
Christians drew first blood in January. Pogroms followed months later. That sequence matters because reprisal logic is routinely accepted when explaining Fulani violence today, but selectively denied elsewhere.
For historical context:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_anti-Igbo_pogrom
The Civil War (1967–1970): Armed Secession by a Christian-Led Region
The Nigerian Civil War began when the Eastern Region, dominated by Igbo Christians, declared secession as the Republic of Biafra in May 1967. That war was initiated by the secessionist side against the Nigerian state.
Again, this is not theology—it is historical sequencing. Violence did not fall from the sky in one direction.
For background:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War
The Standard Applied Today: Outcome, Not Intent
Fast-forward to contemporary Nigeria. Fulani herdsmen are branded terrorists not because of religious manifestos but because of what their actions do: kill civilians, destroy villages, displace populations, and go unpunished.
This article applies that same test to Christian-perpetrated violence.
The 1980s: Escalation Begins, Euphemisms Follow
Kasuwan Magani, Kaduna State (1980)
Often cited as an early ethno-religious clash in southern Kaduna. Documentation is thin and responsibility mixed, but it marks the beginning of recurring violence in the zone.
General timeline references appear in:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_violence_in_Nigeria
Kafanchan Riots, Kaduna State (March 1987)
The violence began at the College of Education, Kafanchan, during the Christian evangelical campaign known as Mission ’87. A preacher, Rev. Abubakar Bako, allegedly made remarks offensive to Islam.
Muslim students initiated attacks, burning churches. Christians retaliated by burning mosques. Violence spread to Kaduna and Zaria, leaving dozens dead.
This is important because it establishes a reprisal template long before the term became fashionable.
Contemporary reporting and summaries:
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-07-18-me-594-story.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_violence_in_Nigeria
Zangon-Kataf, Kaduna State (1992): Behavior That Meets the Test
In February and May 1992, Christian Atyap mobs carried out mass killings of Hausa Muslim civilians in Zangon-Kataf.
Trigger: dispute over market relocation and land use.
Outcome: hundreds killed, homes destroyed, bodies hacked with machetes.
Aftermath: selective prosecutions; no comprehensive justice.
The violence was framed locally as reprisal. By the logic used today against Fulani herdsmen, that framing changes nothing.
Official and academic summaries cite the Justice Cudjoe Commission:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Zangon_Kataf_crises
https://olongoafrica.com/a-crisis-like-no-other/
Plateau State (2001–2011): Pogroms Sanitised by Language
Jos Riots (2001)
Christian mobs attacked Muslim neighbourhoods in Jos, Plateau State. Mosques were destroyed. Thousands were displaced. The language used was communal crisis.
Background summaries:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_violence_in_Nigeria
Yelwa–Shendam, Plateau State (2002–2004)
This cycle is among the clearest examples of disproportionate reprisal.
24 February 2004: Muslim/Fulani attackers killed 75–78 Christians in Yelwa, including 48 in a church compound.
2–3 May 2004: Christian Tarok militias surrounded Yelwa and killed approximately 700 Muslims, mostly Fulani, destroyed the town, and displaced tens of thousands.
Human Rights Watch documented the sequence, witnesses, and absence of justice.
The report, titled “Revenge in the Name of Religion” (2005), details the cycle and its outcomes:
https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/05/25/revenge-name-religion/cycle-violence-plateau-and-kano-states
A concise summary is available at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yelwa_massacre
January 2010 Anti-Fulani Pogroms, Plateau State
In Kuru Karama, Tim-Tim, Sabon Gida Kanar, and surrounding villages, Christian mobs killed 170–300+ Muslims. Bodies were dumped in wells. Entire settlements were erased.
Human Rights Watch confirmed the killings and the absence of prosecutions in its 2013 report “Leave Everything to God”:
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/12/leave-everything-god/accountability-inter-communal-violence-plateau-and-kaduna
Kaduna State, April 2011: Election Violence
Following the presidential election, Christian mobs killed hundreds of Muslims in southern Kaduna. Reprisals followed elsewhere.
Again, HRW documented the cycle and the failure of accountability in the same 2013 report linked above.
IPOB and the Eastern Security Network: Terrorism by Legal Definition
In September 2017, the Nigerian government formally designated the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) a terrorist organisation. The designation was upheld on appeal.
Its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), has carried out:
Attacks on police stations and prisons
Killings of security personnel
Enforcement of sit-at-home orders through violence
Targeted killings of Northerners and Muslims, including the 2022 murder of Harira Jubril and her four children in Imo State
Despite this, media language remains cautious and conditional.
Background and documentation:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indigenous_People_of_Biafra
https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nigeria
https://www.amnesty.org/es/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/AFR4493632025ENGLISH.pdf
Fulani Herdsmen: What the Evidence Actually Shows
1950s–1970s: Coexistence
Disputes were largely resolved through compensation mechanisms such as burti. No mass killings.
Crisis Group overview:
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/252-herders-against-farmers-nigerias-expanding-deadly-conflict
1980s–1990s: Structural Stress
Desertification, population growth, and the collapse of grazing reserves escalated conflicts.
Academic case study:
https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/the-farmer-fulani-herdsmen-clashes-and-the-socio-economic-development-of-north-western-nigeria-a-case-study-of-southern-kaduna/
2000s–Present: Reprisal Cycles
Most major attacks are described as reprisals following cattle rustling, vigilante killings, or expulsions.
Agatu, Benue State (2016): Fulani leaders explicitly cited earlier killings of herders and theft of cattle as triggers.
Premium Times interview (February 2016):
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/200426-exclusive-struck-agatu-fulani-herdsmen.html
Background summary:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agatu_massacres
BBC overview describing cyclical violence:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36139388
The “Unfinished Dan Fodio Jihad” Claim Does Not Survive Evidence
There is no evidence that Fulani herder violence is a continuation of Usman dan Fodio’s 1804 jihad.
No central command.
No forced conversion campaigns.
No Sharia expansion programme.
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point explicitly warns against mischaracterising the crisis as inherently jihadist:
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-fulani-crisis-communal-violence-and-radicalization-in-the-sahel/
Media Framing and Narrative Manufacture
Southern, Lagos–Ibadan–based newspapers—Punch, Vanguard, Tribune, Guardian, ThisDay—routinely frame Fulani violence as jihad, invasion, or Fulanisation. Northern outlets like Daily Trust emphasise ecology, economics, and cycles.
Academic media analyses, including a 2025 Sage Journals study, document these regional framing differences.
International advocacy groups amplify the most sensational versions. Claims such as InterSociety’s 100,000+ Christian deaths since 2009 were publicly questioned and debunked by the BBC for lack of data.
Fulani herdsmen have no media houses, no international lobby, no donor-funded advocacy networks.
Scripture and Selective Scrutiny
One of the most common claims used to justify branding Muslims—and by extension Fulani herdsmen—as inherently violent is the assertion that the Qur’an teaches violence against non-Muslims and encourages their killing. This claim is repeated across Nigerian media, sermons, opinion columns, and international advocacy spaces, often without context, scholarship, or intellectual honesty. Violence occurs, the logic goes, therefore Islam must command it.
That argument collapses once the Qur’an is examined with the same standards Christians insist on for their own scripture. The Qur’an repeatedly restricts the use of force to self-defence and active aggression, not belief difference. “Fight in the way of God those who fight you, but do not transgress. God does not love the transgressors” (Qur’an 2:190). This is a limitation, not a blank cheque.
The Qur’an explicitly rejects forced conversion. “There is no compulsion in religion” (Qur’an 2:256). Claims that Islam mandates conversion by the sword—or that Fulani violence is about Islamisation—have no textual foundation in the Qur’an itself.
The Qur’an also commands peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims who are not hostile: “God does not forbid you from being kind and just to those who do not fight you because of religion or expel you from your homes” (Qur’an 60:8). Even the much-abused Qur’an 9:5 is tied to a specific treaty violation in a defined war context, with surrounding verses explicitly protecting peaceful non-Muslims.
Yet these contextual readings are routinely denied to Muslims. Qur’anic verses are flattened, stripped of history, and weaponised to explain any violence involving Muslims—whether criminal, retaliatory, or local. Context is dismissed as deception. Nuance is treated as excuse.
Now apply the same scrutiny inward. The Bible, both Old and New Testaments, contains passages that—read plainly—command or describe total destruction, ethnic extermination, and the killing of non-combatants, including women and children. These are not hostile interpretations; they are direct textual instructions.
Deuteronomy 20:16–17 states: “However, in the cities of the nations the Lord your God is giving you as an inheritance, do not leave alive anything that breathes. Completely destroy them…”
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Deuteronomy+20%3A16-17&version=NIV
1 Samuel 15:3 commands: “Now go, attack the Amalekites and totally destroy all that belongs to them. Do not spare them; put to death men and women, children and infants…”
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+Samuel+15%3A3&version=NIV
Numbers 31:17–18 instructs: “Now kill all the boys. And kill every woman who has slept with a man… but save for yourselves every girl who has never slept with a man.”
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Numbers+31%3A17-18&version=NIV
Joshua 6:21 records: “They devoted the city to the Lord and destroyed with the sword every living thing in it—men and women, young and old…”
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Joshua+6%3A21&version=NIV
Even the New Testament contains violent imagery that is rarely acknowledged. Luke 19:27 states: “But those enemies of mine who did not want me to be king over them—bring them here and kill them in front of me.”
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Luke+19%3A27&version=NIV
And Matthew 10:34 records: “Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword.”
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+10%3A34&version=NIV
Christian scholars rightly contextualise these passages—historical setting, covenant limits, metaphor, parable. But here is the unavoidable question Nigerian media refuses to ask: if these verses were in the Qur’an rather than the Bible, what would the headlines look like? There would be no context, no patience, no scholarship—only claims of genocidal theology. That is selective scrutiny. The issue is not scripture; it is who is allowed explanation and who is denied it.
The Only Honest Standard
If reprisal does not excuse Fulani mass killings, it excuses no one.
If outcome defines terrorism for one group, it defines it for all.
If justice is absent, cycles continue.
Anything else is language games.
Facts are sacred.
Mohammed Bello Doka can be reached via [email protected]
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