12 January, 2026
by Mohammed Bello Doka
On 16 June 1964, the Vatican formally erected the Roman Catholic Diocese of Sokoto. That date is not a rumour. It is not an estimate. It is an official ecclesiastical act recorded in Catholic directories and historical archives.
Today, that diocese is led by Matthew Hassan Kukah, one of Nigeria’s most outspoken clerics. He has publicly criticized governments, spoken on national television, granted interviews to major newspapers including The Punch, Vanguard, Premium Times, and Daily Trust, and issued Christmas homilies that have generated national debate.
Let us pause here.
Sokoto is not just any Nigerian state. Sokoto became the seat of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1809, consolidated under Muhammad Bello, son of Usman dan Fodio. It is widely described as the spiritual headquarters of Sunni Islam in Nigeria. It remains overwhelmingly Muslim.
Yet since 1964, a Catholic Diocese has operated there continuously.
If Sokoto were structurally designed to exclude Christianity, how did a Catholic ecclesiastical jurisdiction survive for over 60 years?
Let us broaden the record.
The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Kaduna was promoted to a diocese on 29 June 1953, later becoming an archdiocese in 1959.
The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Jos was similarly promoted on 29 June 1953.
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Maiduguri was erected on 7 June 1966.
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Kano was promoted on 22 April 1999.
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Zaria was established on 5 December 2000.
Most recently, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Katsina was created on 16 October 2023, carved out of Sokoto.
These are not symbolic missions. These are formal canonical jurisdictions with land, parishes, schools, rectories, seminaries, clergy, and registered worshippers.
So the question becomes unavoidable:
If northern Nigeria — particularly Sokoto — is institutionally hostile to Christianity, why does the Catholic Church possess decades-old diocesan structures there?
Now reverse the mirror.
Anambra State is overwhelmingly Christian.
Imo State is overwhelmingly Christian.
Rivers State and Bayelsa State are overwhelmingly Christian.
Who is the Chief Imam of Anambra State?
On what date was that office created?
Where is the central mosque in Awka? In Nnewi? In Aba? In Yenagoa? In Owerri?
On what dates were they established?
Under what land allocation documents were they granted land?
Is there a publicly recognized statewide Islamic authority structure in Anambra comparable to a Catholic Diocese?
These are not rhetorical traps. They are measurable institutional questions.
Let us examine constitutional reality.
Section 38 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. That provision applies equally in Sokoto and in Anambra.
If religious freedom is measured by constitutional text alone, then Sokoto and Anambra stand on equal legal footing.
If religious freedom is measured by demographic dominance, then minorities everywhere will appear disadvantaged.
But if religious freedom is measured by institutional survival and public operation, then the facts must be confronted.
The Catholic Diocese of Sokoto has existed since 16 June 1964.
Its bishop speaks nationally.
Its churches operate openly.
Mass is celebrated publicly.
Christmas is observed publicly.
Clergy move freely.
Has there been religious tension in northern Nigeria? Yes.
Has there been violence in parts of northern Nigeria? Yes.
But violence has also occurred in southern Nigeria, including mob attacks and communal clashes involving religious identity.
The existence of incidents does not automatically prove institutional design.
So let us ask plainly:
Has the Sokoto State Government ever legally banned the Catholic Diocese of Sokoto?
Has it revoked its registration?
Has it outlawed Mass?
Has it shut down diocesan schools?
If such documents exist, produce them.
Now return again to the South-East and South-South.
How many Muslim-majority Local Government Areas exist in Anambra?
How many Islamic higher institutions operate with state recognition in Imo?
How many central mosques in Bayelsa were built on state-allocated land?
Who is the formally recognized Chief Imam representing the Muslim minority in Rivers State at state level?
On what date was he installed?
Is his office codified in state structure?
The absence of documentation answers as loudly as documentation itself.
Sokoto is frequently branded in public commentary as oppressive toward Christians. Yet since 1964, the Catholic Church has maintained a full diocesan structure there. That is an institutional fact.
Meanwhile, in states that are over 95 percent Christian by demographic estimate, the Islamic minority does not possess equivalently visible statewide religious hierarchies comparable to a diocese.
This is not to accuse the South-East or South-South of intolerance.
It is to demand consistency.
If Sokoto’s historical association with the caliphate is invoked as evidence of structural exclusion, then the Christian dominance of southeastern states must also be examined through the same institutional lens.
Does Sokoto allow a Catholic bishop to operate? Yes.
Has that bishop publicly criticized national leadership? Yes.
Has the diocese expanded to the point of birthing a new diocese in Katsina in October 2023? Yes.
These are verifiable milestones.
Religious freedom is not measured by noise on social media.
It is measured by institutional endurance, legal status, land ownership, public worship, and leadership recognition.
So again, the question stands:
Matthew Hassan Kukah is Bishop of the Sokoto Diocese — a diocese erected on 16 June 1964 in the heart of what is widely described as the caliphate’s spiritual seat.
Who is the Chief Imam of Anambra?
On what date was that office created?
And if no such structure exists, what does that reveal about how we define — and selectively debate — religious freedom in Nigeria?
Mohammed Bello Doka can be reached via [email protected]
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