The Department of State Services (DSS) has uncovered a major gunrunning network operating through Kaduna State, in what security analysts describe as one of the most significant breakthroughs against arms trafficking in recent years.
Governor Uba Sani, who quickly commended the DSS for the “highly coordinated covert operation,” said the success reinforced the credibility of his administration’s Kaduna Peace Model — an intelligence-led, non-kinetic security framework focused on dialogue, inter-agency collaboration, and community engagement.
The covert operation, executed in Igabi and Kachia Local Government Areas, led to the arrest of three suspects believed to be part of a wider syndicate that supplied arms to bandit groups across the Northwest. Among the recovered items were five AK-47 rifles, a PKT machine gun, over 220 rounds of live ammunition, four magazines, and ₦69,050 concealed within maize sacks and vehicle compartments.
Security reports revealed that the weapons were en route to bandit camps in Niger State, with Kaduna serving as a central transit corridor. Intelligence officers described the network as a “well-organized logistics chain” that had exploited weak surveillance and community infiltration to move weapons undetected.
Governor Sani, through the Commissioner for Internal Security and Home Affairs, Sule Shuaibu (SAN), lauded the DSS and other agencies for their synergy and reaffirmed the state’s commitment to intelligence-led operations.
“There will be no hiding place for criminals in Kaduna State. We will continue to support all security agencies in dismantling criminal networks threatening peace and stability,” the governor said.
However, the success of the DSS operation has reignited a wave of probing questions about the governor’s widely celebrated non-kinetic peace strategy. Critics argue that while the Kaduna Peace Model has gained national praise, the discovery of such a major arms route within the state’s boundaries exposes serious gaps in local intelligence and community vigilance.
If the Peace Model is indeed working, how did this gunrunning syndicate operate freely for so long?
How many more of such networks exist, silently arming terrorists across Kaduna’s borders?
Beyond applause, what proactive role did the state’s intelligence infrastructure play in the dismantling of the syndicate?
And as the state celebrates, will these suspects be transparently prosecuted—or quietly recycled into the system through corruption and weak legal processes?
Security observers say the success of this operation belongs primarily to the DSS and the federal security architecture, not the Kaduna Peace Model itself. While Sani’s non-kinetic approach has fostered some calm through dialogue and engagement, critics insist that without strong deterrence and visible accountability, peace remains fragile and reversible.
Now, analysts are calling on the Kaduna State Government to publish verifiable data on the Peace Model’s achievements since inception — including crime reduction rates, number of arms intercepted, community intelligence reports, and prosecution outcomes — to demonstrate that the strategy is not merely a political talking point but a measurable framework for sustainable security.
Until then, the question lingers: Can Kaduna truly secure peace through dialogue alone, when its soil continues to serve as a highway for guns, bullets, and blood?