By Mohammed Bello Doka
The sharp public exchange between the National Security Adviser, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, and former Kaduna governor Nasir El-Rufai over alleged payments to bandits has reopened ugly questions about Nigeria’s strategy in the North-West: is the state buying peace — or simply negotiating survival while terrorists keep killing?
El-Rufai — speaking on national television and in subsequent interviews — accused the federal government of pursuing a “non-kinetic” approach that amounts to pampering bandits: he said the administration had been “paying and empowering” criminal gangs with monthly allowances and food, turning dangerous militants into a parallel power that now holds sway in parts of the North. Those remarks were part of a broader critique in which the former governor said the country is “in trouble” because violent actors have been allowed to take leadership in many communities.
The Office of the National Security Adviser fired back within 24 hours. In a statement signed by the NSA’s legal director, Zakari Mijinyawa, Ribadu described El-Rufai’s claims as “false, baseless and deeply insulting” to the sacrifices of security personnel, and insisted that no arm of the current administration has engaged in ransom payments or offered inducements to criminals. The statement stressed that the government’s policy combines kinetic operations with community engagement and that thousands of hostages have been released and several kingpins neutralized under operations coordinated with the Office of the NSA.
Into this war of words have come reports — and apparently some action on the ground — that complicate both claims. Multiple recent accounts say Islamic clerics led by a Kaduna-based scholar, identified in several reports as Sheikh Musa Yusuf Asadussunna (also styled Assadus Sunnah), travelled into forest enclaves and mediated meetings between government representatives and the camps of notorious bandit boss Bello Turji. Those interventions are credited with the release of dozens of hostages and the surrender of some weapons in early August. Sources reporting the clerics’ role say the engagement was requested by residents and facilitated by a small peace committee of religious leaders.
That, in turn, prompts three uncomfortable but critical facts for any reader to weigh:
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Negotiation ≠ Payment — but can look like it. Releasing hostages and recovering arms after mediated meetings is being touted by some as progress; to others it looks like a de-facto deal. The government insists cleric-led talks are community diplomacy, not ransom. But critics — led vocally by El-Rufai — warn that even non-monetary inducements or promises of amnesty create perverse incentives that reward mass-kidnapping. Ribadu’s categorical denial that the state pays ransoms is a key official line; opponents ask for transparency on who met whom, what was promised, and whether any state resources changed hands.
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Bello Turji remains lethal and operational. Regardless of the clerics’ reported successes, Turji and his network continue to be blamed for mass killings, large ambushes and kidnappings across Zamfara and neighbouring states. Security and media accounts in recent months document attacks that left dozens dead and scores abducted — incidents that form the basis for El-Rufai’s insistence that the government is still losing the fight. The military and state governments, for their part, point to operations that have killed or captured several commanders and say they are degrading Turji’s capacity, but the carnage continues.
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Vigilante pressure forced the reconciliation debate into the open. Local vigilante groups — widely known in the region as Yan-Sakai (and variants of that name) — have, at times, driven back bandit bands and inflicted heavy losses on kingpins. Several reports and security analyses show that as Yan-Sakai and other community forces began to push hard against some camps, state and federal actors either opened or appeared to tolerate reconciliation channels to avoid an escalation that could widen ethnic reprisal and civilian casualties. Critics argue the federal “reconciliation” pivot came only when vigilantes were proving capable of confronting the bandits directly — a move some read as evidence that the state is reacting to domestic pressure rather than leading a coherent strategy.
What the facts on the ground suggest
- If El-Rufai is right that the government’s strategy has elements that reward criminality, the consequence is strategic: more money or guarantees — even informal ones — make kidnapping more attractive, prolonging insecurity and civilian suffering. His public anger is fuelled by ongoing high-casualty attacks attributed to Turji and others.
- If Ribadu is right and the ONSA has not paid or incentivised bandits, then the engagement of clerics and the resulting releases can be read as pragmatic conflict-management — messy but possibly the lesser evil to protect civilians in the short term while kinetic operations continue. Ribadu’s office has published tallies of neutralised kingpins and released hostages as evidence of a combined approach.
The Assadus Sunnah factor: mediator or front?
Named reports that a cleric — Sheikh Musa Yusuf Asadussunna — led meetings with Turji’s men and secured hostage releases raise two questions any credible investigation must answer: who mandated the cleric’s mission, and what explicit guarantees (if any) were made to the bandits? West African and local papers report the cleric’s committee as an intermediary acting at the request of communities; other outlets suggest the clerics coordinated with security contacts. At present, public documentation is thin: statements from the NSA deny state payments, while the cleric and his team claim only to have mediated and urged repentance. Nigeria needs transparency here: names, dates, and the content of any agreement should be presented to the public — redacting operational details where necessary — so that citizens can judge whether the approach reduces violence or institutionalises impunity.
Why El-Rufai’s stance resonates — and why it worries some
El-Rufai’s message gets traction because Turji’s attacks have continued despite repeated government assurances. For families who have lost loved ones, the sight of a bandit leader walking out of the bush to negotiate — then remaining operational — looks like capitulation. On the flip side, hardline rejection of any negotiation (“kill them all,” as some of El-Rufai’s past remarks have implied) risks prolonged warfare with enormous civilian cost, and has in the past pushed some states to rely on irregular militias with their own human-rights records. Both lines of argument have real costs; that is why a very public, verifiable account of any talks — who attended, what was agreed, who enforced the terms — is essential.
What independent observers and analysts advise
Security analysts and humanitarian groups who follow the North-West recommend a multi-track response: robust, intelligence-led kinetic operations against hardened criminal networks; careful community protection that supports civilians rather than arming one group against another; credible reintegration or amnesty programmes conditioned on verifiable disarmament; and independent monitoring of any negotiated outcomes so that deals are not simply a cloak for reward. They caution strongly against secrecy in any deals: opaque negotiations leave room for corruption and false incentives.
Questions still unanswered
- Were state actors ever a party to promises made to Turji’s network or allied factions — monetary or otherwise? The NSA denies it; El-Rufai insists otherwise. Public documentation is lacking.
- Who mandated cleric-mediators such as Sheikh Musa Yusuf Asadussunna, and did they act with or without formal security-sector oversight? Reports vary between “community-led” and “security-coordinated” interventions.
- Can reconciliation talks be monitored and enforced so that released hostages are not merely exchanged for future kidnappings? History across Nigeria’s bandit hotspots shows that unmonitored deals tend to break down.
Takeaway
The facts now publicly available paint a conflicted picture: the federal government says it is prosecuting a joint kinetic and community engagement campaign; critics — led vocally by El-Rufai — say elements of the strategy amount to rewarding criminality. Reports that respected clerics negotiated the release of hostages from Turji’s camps complicate the narrative but do not resolve it. Given that Turji-linked violence continues to cost lives, El-Rufai’s alarm — and the public demand for clarity — cannot be dismissed out of hand.
What citizens should demand now is simple: transparency. If the government has engaged mediators, show who asked them to act and what guarantees were made. If no state payments were made, publish the evidence of arrests, seizures and operations that substantiate that claim. And above all, ensure that short-term deals do not become long-term incentives for kidnapping and massacre.