by Mohammed Bello Doka
22 June, 2026.
Between May 2023 and April 2024, Nigerians paid an estimated 2.2 trillion naira, approximately 1.4 billion US dollars, in ransom to kidnappers. This staggering sum, documented by the National Bureau of Statistics and the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre, exceeds Nigeria's entire defence budget for 2024. During this same period, 2.23 million Nigerians were abducted, with 65 percent of affected households paying ransom to secure the release of their loved ones. The North-West region alone accounted for 1.2 trillion naira in ransom payments. These figures are not merely statistics; they represent a nation held hostage by its own citizens and a government that cannot protect its people.
The scale of this financial haemorrhage reveals a fundamental contradiction at the heart of Nigeria's counter-terrorism strategy. The government publicly declares that it does not negotiate with terrorists, yet the operational reality tells a different story. Ransom payments have become an entrenched feature of the security landscape, transforming kidnapping into a lucrative industry and empowering the very groups Nigeria claims to be defeating. The question is no longer whether Nigeria can defeat terrorism while paying ransoms, but whether defeat is already inevitable.
The killing of high-ranking military officers illustrates the human cost of this failure. On November 14, 2025, Brigadier General Musa Uba, commander of the 25 Task Force Brigade, led his troops on a routine patrol in the ISWAP-dominated area of Damboa in Borno State. They encountered an ambush near Wajiroko village, and the general became separated from his forces, finding himself alone in hostile territory. He began coordinating his rescue using WhatsApp on his personal phone, agreeing with the rescue team on how to proceed. A helicopter was deployed to locate him, but he could not be found. The military leadership initially denied his capture, claiming he had safely returned to base. Yet ISWAP released footage of his interrogation and execution. President Bola Tinubu subsequently confirmed his death on November 18, 2025.
The circumstances of General Uba's death reveal troubling vulnerabilities. Analysts have noted that ISWAP's growing use of technology, including drones for intelligence and surveillance, may have aided the group in detecting his hideout quickly. The Nigerian military's inability to locate him despite deploying a helicopter suggests that it lacked the necessary intelligence and technological capabilities. This raises questions about whether the country's substantial defence spending, which in the 2025 budget reached 6.57 trillion naira, has been directed toward equipping troops with modern tracking technology. Military experts have observed that troops ought to wear Global Positioning System devices that constantly transmit their locations, enabling commanders to see exactly where they are without waiting for calls or searching blindly. This appears not to have been the case.
The pattern of high-ranking officers being killed by insurgents continued in April 2026, when Brigadier General Oseni Omoh Braimah, commander of the 29 Task Force Brigade, was killed during a predawn assault on a military base in Benisheikh, Borno State. The attack, which involved Boko Haram fighters, reportedly overwhelmed troops and caused serious damage before the attackers withdrew. President Tinubu again confirmed the death, praising the courage of the fallen soldiers and declaring that the government's resolve to defeat terrorism was stronger than ever. Yet the loss of a third general since 2021 has renewed attention on the evolving risks faced by senior commanders in Nigeria's long-running war against insurgency.
The abduction and death of Major General Rabe Abubakar, a retired officer who served as Director of Defence Information, further illustrates the reach of terrorist groups beyond the traditional conflict zones. On May 30, 2026, he was kidnapped alongside his wife on the Matazu-Sayaya road in Katsina State, an area that has become one of the most volatile in the North-West. Despite the military launching Operation Clean Sweep III to track down those responsible, the general died while in captivity on June 13, reportedly from complications of diabetes and hypertension. His wife was subsequently released. The Katsina State government confirmed his death, describing it as a dark moment that highlighted the urgent need for a stronger security response.
The Senate launched an investigation into the deaths of these officers, with particular focus on reports of internal sabotage and compromise of their locations. Military insiders have suggested that General Uba may have been betrayed, with his coordinates leaking through carelessness or malicious intent after they spread beyond the immediate command chain. Similar concerns have been raised about the attack that killed General Braimah, with some sources suggesting that equipment failures and maintenance issues may have contributed to his vulnerability.
The Nigerian government officially denies paying ransoms, yet the sheer volume of ransom payments documented by the National Bureau of Statistics and other credible institutions suggests otherwise. The military has arrested some suspects in connection with these attacks, including a 15-year-old boy involved in the operation that killed General Braimah, who was reportedly carrying 850,000 naira in logistics support for the group. However, there have been no public reports of the high-level commanders responsible for these sophisticated operations being apprehended. The killers of General Uba, General Braimah, and Major General Abubakar remain at large. This pattern of accountability failure undermines public confidence and suggests that the networks enabling terrorism are well-protected.
The connection between ransom payments and the sophistication of terrorist operations is undeniable. The 2.2 trillion naira extracted from citizens between May 2023 and April 2024 represents more than a financial loss; it constitutes a direct transfer of resources to the very groups that threaten national security. These funds are used to purchase weapons, night-vision goggles, and other equipment that military sources have traced to recent ambushes and attacks. As ISWAP and Boko Haram become increasingly sophisticated in their use of technology, the Nigerian military must invest in counter-surveillance capabilities and strengthen its intelligence networks. The country must also address the corruption and weak governance that allow kidnapping to flourish as a business model.
The death of three generals in less than five years is a sobering indicator of the challenges facing Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts. These officers died doing what they were sworn to do, leading troops in dangerous and complex environments. Their sacrifice demands more than mourning; it demands a reckoning with the systemic weaknesses that made their deaths avoidable. Until Nigeria confronts the contradiction of fighting terrorism while paying 2.2 trillion naira in ransom, and until it holds those responsible for these killings accountable, the war against insurgency will remain an endless and costly struggle. The nation cannot defeat an enemy it is effectively subsidising. The path to victory requires not only military valour but also the political will to break the financial pipelines that sustain terrorism and to build a security apparatus capable of protecting both its citizens and its soldiers.
Mohammed Bello Doka can be reached via [email protected]
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