...Federal backing for peace talks with one of Nigeria’s deadliest terrorists sparks outrage, as critics say politics — not strategy — is driving the decision.
In a move that has ignited fierce public criticism, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration is backing negotiations with notorious bandit kingpin Bello Turji, even as the terrorist reels from crushing military defeats and relentless attacks by community vigilantes. For many in the Northwest, the timing is a baffling — and dangerous — choice: instead of supporting the Yan Sakai and other local forces to finish him off, the government appears to be offering Turji a political lifeline. With a history of pocketing huge payouts and returning to violence, and fresh allegations that certain state politicians have long-standing ties to armed groups, critics warn that this is less a peace effort than a calculated political maneuver that could once again leave rural Nigerians to pay the price in blood.
A History Written in Betrayals
Turji’s reputation as a serial betrayer of peace deals is not speculation — it’s well-documented. Previous negotiations have seen him receive cash payments, vehicles, and other concessions, only to resume attacks on villages weeks or months later. In Moriki and other towns, residents were forced to pay millions of naira in “peace levies” to Turji’s men just to avoid slaughter. Amnesty schemes under past state administrations saw him allegedly gifted Hilux pickups and protection in exchange for disarmament — weapons that he later replaced with ease.
The current talks, facilitated by Sheikh Musa Yusuf Asadussunnah, have reportedly freed 32 hostages and secured phased arms surrenders. Sheikh Musa insists the process has the blessing of the Federal Government and security agencies. “This is an open and transparent peace initiative backed by President Tinubu and the National Security Adviser,” the cleric said. But many in Zamfara and Sokoto remember similar promises — and how they ended.
Turji’s Vulnerability and the Yan Sakai Factor
The irony is bitter. In January 2025, military operations under Operation Fansan Yanma eliminated seven of Turji’s top commanders, more than two dozen fighters, and even one of his sons. Camps were destroyed, supply lines cut, and in June the Zamfara Civilian Protection Guard killed over 100 of his fighters in Shinkafi. By all accounts, Turji is weaker now than at any point in recent years.
Yet instead of finishing the job, Abuja is calling for dialogue. For the Yan Sakai vigilantes — grassroots defenders drawn from the very communities Turji has ravaged — the move is nothing short of betrayal. “We don’t negotiate with people who have killed our fathers, our children, and burned our homes,” said one Yan Sakai leader in Shinkafi. “If the government won’t finish him, we will. We don’t need his promises, we need him gone.”
A Grudge That Runs Deeper Than Politics
Turji himself has openly admitted that his deepest animosity is reserved for the Yan Sakai, not the military or police. In a past Hausa radio interview, he accused the vigilantes of killing Fulani herders, stealing cattle, and burning settlements — acts he claims pushed him into banditry. But in the same breath, he accused “powerful politicians” of funding rival bandit leaders to weaken him, a thinly veiled reference to state-level actors with vested interests in the Northwest’s tangled web of armed groups.
These accusations have fueled suspicion that the current talks are as much about managing political relationships as they are about security. Supporting the Yan Sakai to finish Turji could expose or dismantle networks of influence that some politicians depend on. Negotiation, on the other hand, keeps him within a controllable space — a dangerous calculation for a man with his record.
The Risk of Rewarding Violence
By choosing negotiation now, the Federal Government risks sending the most dangerous signal possible: that in Nigeria, mass murderers can escape justice if they have enough leverage. History has shown that every concession to warlords under the banner of peace — every naira, vehicle, or safe corridor — becomes an investment in the next cycle of violence.
If President Tinubu’s administration is serious about ending terror in the Northwest, it must abandon political half-measures and commit to backing the only forces that have proven unwilling to compromise with killers — the community defenders and security personnel on the front lines. Anything less will be a recycled mistake, and this time, the cost could be even higher.